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1 Introduction and motivation
Representability stands out among the rationality properties of a ranking that
make it intuitively tractable. Nevertheless in the analysis of ranking infinite
utility streams, the literature has seldom provided representable social welfare
relations (SWRs) on [0, 1]N that verify some form of equity and interesting
versions of the Pareto principle for efficiency. The abundance of impossibility
results involving continuity or representability invites to argue that “continuity
and representability can be considered rather demanding in infinite-horizon
settings” (Bossert et al. [8, p. 588]). In this work we produce new evidences
that lead us to concur in the position that there is an intrinsic incompatibility
of representability with attractive sets of axioms on [0, 1]N .
In this regard the seminal contribution is Basu and Mitra [6]. It establishes
that any Strongly Paretian social welfare function (or SWF, i.e., representable
SWR) on {0, 1}N must contradict Anonymity, i.e., the equal treatment of the
generations. The literature has provided further results in that line. Relaxing
the requirement of Strong Pareto to Weak Pareto also excludes Anonymity
in the [0, 1]N case (v., Basu and Mitra [7, Theorem 4]). Likewise, social eval-
uations of [0, 1]N that verify a weaker form of the Pareto principle named
Weak Dominance must contradict a fairly weak distributional principle named
Hammond Equity for the Future (cf., Banerjee [5]). Although Basu and Mi-
tra [7, Theorem 5] assures that there are Weakly Dominant and Anonymous
SWFs on [0, 1]N , the authors are aware that such evaluations have no practi-
cal utility because they must contradict Monotonicity. 2 It is also known that
Strongly Paretian SWFs on [0, 1]N must contradict other two fundamental
equity properties, namely the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and Hammond
Equity. The reason is that any evaluation with the properties of Monotonic-
ity and either the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle or Hammond Equity must
verify Hammond Equity for the Future (cf., Asheim et al. [3]) thus Baner-
jee’s impossibility result applies. These arguments hint that Strong Pareto
is a source of incompatibilities in the study of intergenerational conflicts on
[0, 1]N under the assumption of representability.
But Strong Pareto is excessively demanding in e.g., the analysis of economies
with an infinite population, therefore it is arguable that for certain purposes it
may suffice to be equipped with weaker forms of Paretianism. A natural ques-
tion arises as to whether possibility results can emerge by replacing Strong
Pareto with Monotonicity plus Weak Pareto as the efficiency requirement.
We believe that this specification is natural for the following reasons. As was
2 This condition demands that if no generation is worse off at x than at y then the
social evaluation does not rank y above x. It is widely considered to be a necessary
condition for efficiency.
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mentioned, any applicable restricted version of the Pareto axiom must in-
corporate Monotonicity. This excludes adopting certain additional variants of
Paretianity like the aforementioned Weak Dominance, because in the presence
of Monotonicity it yields the full force of the Pareto axiom. However, Weak
Pareto does not suffer from this handicap and its spirit rarely raises objec-
tions. Besides, it has been adopted in related studies like Basu and Mitra [7]
and Hara et al. [10].
Nevertheless in this work we complement the negative conclusions that have
been presented in the following sense: For social evaluations of [0, 1]N that ver-
ify Weak Pareto, not only Anonymity but also various equity axioms relating
to inequality aversion are banned. To be precise, we check that there is no SWF
satisfying Weak Pareto and any one of the following three consequentialist eq-
uity principles: the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, Hammond Equity, and a
variant of the latter that we call Very Weak Inequality Aversion. The case of
Hammond Equity for the Future is different but also negative: Although it
is trivial that there are SWFs that verify Hammond Equity for the Future,
Monotonicity, and Weak Pareto, this set of axioms does not prevent a dicta-
torial behavior by any future generation (consider the case of the evaluation
W(x = (x1, x2, ..., xn, ...)) = xi for any fixed i > 2, where generation i is dic-
tatorial). Thus unless one can guarantee the existence of SWFs with additional
properties that avoid dictatorships, such compatibility is without interest as
to applications. To this purpose, adding Anonymity is a natural proposal but
as was mentioned, it is of no avail –because Anonymity is incompatible with
Weak Pareto. We here prove that another natural alternative, namely, adding
Independent Future instead, leads to impossibility as well (which bears some
comparison with the recent analysis in Asheim et al. [3]).
The overall picture that we obtain confirms the position that for an increas-
ingly large list of important equity axioms, the representability axiom is in-
compatible with sufficiently nice efficiency when the domain of utilities is
[0, 1]N . A possible positive escape to this situation that does not reject repre-
sentability is the appeal to more reduced programmes spaces, e.g., of the form
Y N with Y ⊆ N . For purposes like the analysis of infinitely repeated finite
games, or benefits given by monetary endowments that therefore are multiples
of the smallest indivisible unit, this is a very realistic possibility. The inter-
ested reader may find some preliminary evidences in that line in Alcantud and
Garc´ıa-Sanz [1,2]. Alternatively, one may well wonder about the parallel anal-
ysis when both continuity and representability are dropped. Bossert et al. [8]
gives positive answers in all the cases we have considered. From their contri-
bution it follows that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, Hammond Equity,
Very Weak Inequality Aversion, and Hammond Equity for the Future are each
compatible with Anonymous and Strongly Paretian social orderings. To wit,
their Theorem 1 proves that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is compatible
with Strong Pareto and Anonymity (properly speaking, the class of orderings
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with these three properties is fully identified), and their Theorem 2 proves
that Hammond Equity is compatible with Strong Pareto and Anonymity (the
class of orderings with these three properties is identified too). The fact that
under Strong Pareto, Hammond Equity is equivalent to the requirement that
we call Very Weak Inequality Aversion and it implies Hammond Equity for
the Future, completes the claim.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we do two
things. For one, Subsection 2.1 sets our notation and axioms. For another,
Subsection 2.2 proves some relationships among the axioms. Section 3 presents
our results. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
2 Notation and axioms
Let X denote a subset of RN, that represents a domain of utility sequences
or infinite-horizon utility streams. We adopt the usual notation for such util-
ity streams: x = (x1, ..., xn, .......) ∈ X. By (y)con we mean the constant se-
quence (y, y, ....), (x, (y)con) holds for (x, y, y, y, ....), and (x1, ..., xk, (y)con) =
(x1, ..., xk, y, y, ....) denotes an eventually constant sequence. We write x > y
if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, ..., and x y if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, .... Also,
x > y means x > y and x 6= y.
A social welfare function (SWF) is a function W : X −→ R. In this paper
we are concerned with two sets of axioms of different nature on SWFs, that
can be rephrased for social welfare relations (i.e., binary relations on X) in a
direct manner. We proceed to state and discuss them.
2.1 The axioms
Firstly we introduce some equity axioms of two different classes. Anonymity
is the usual “equal treatment of all generations” postulate a`-la-Sidgwik and
Diamond. We then list some consequentialist equity axioms that implement
preference for egalitarian allocations of utilities among generations in various
senses. Afterwards we discuss about efficiency in this context.
Axiom AN (Anonymity). Any finite permutation of a utility stream produces
a utility stream with the same social utility
Axioms HE below is another equity principle stating that in case of a conflict
between two generations, every other generation being as well off, the stream
where the least favoured generation is better off must be weakly preferred.
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Axiom HE (Hammond Equity). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk > xk
for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x).
A variant of this principle is the following postulate of aversion to inequality
(or pure preference for equity against inequality).
Axiom VWIA (Very Weak Inequality Aversion). If x,y ∈ X are such that
xj > yj = yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then
W(y) >W(x) .
VWIA captures weak preference for streams that do not produce inequal-
ity between two generations when the alternative unequal endowments are
conflicting, every other generation being as well off. Although it seems a es-
pecially basic requirement, it is closely related to HE as will be shown later
on in Subsection 2.2.
We now consider a notion of inequality aversion in a cardinal vein.
Axiom PDT (Pigou-Dalton transfer principle). If x,y ∈ X are such that
there is ε > 0 with yj = xj − ε > yk = xk + ε for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt
when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) > W(x).
PDT has been introduced in this literature by Hara et al. [10], Bossert et al.
[8] –under the name strict transfer principle– and Sakai [11]. 3 It states that
a non-costly transfer of utility from a richer generation to a poorer one must
increase intergenerational welfare if it is not so large as to reverse their relative
ranking.
Further we are concerned with the following axiom that was introduced in
Asheim and Tungodden [4].
Axiom HEF (Hammond Equity for the Future). If x,y ∈ X are such that
x = (x1, (x)con), y = (y1, (y)con) and x1 > y1 > y > x, then W(y) >W(x) .
HEF states the following ethical restriction on the ranking of streams where
the level of utility is constant from the second period on and the present gen-
eration is better-off than the future: If the sacrifice by the present generation
conveys a higher utility for all future generations, then such trade off is weakly
preferred.
3 The formulation in Bossert et al. [8] is different but equivalent: If x,y ∈ X are
such that xj > yj > yk > xk and xj + xk = yj + yk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt
when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) > W(x). This version is parallel in structure to the
HE-related axioms.
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As is apparent there is a similarity in structure among HE, VWIA, and PDT
that is not shared in full by HEF. The latter has been designed as a necessary
condition for equity in the present context. The former three properties are
not exclusive to the infinite-dimensional setting and establish which trade-offs
between two generations are socially favoured. Their ethical implications are
more controvesial than those of HEF, where only particular types of transfers
from the present to the future generations are enforced. In this sense, Asheim
and Tungodden [4] and Asheim et al. [3, Section 3] explain that HEF is a
very weak equity condition that can be endorsed both from an egalitarian and
utilitarian point of view.
We intend to account for some kind of efficiency too. Various axioms capture
the general principle that with respect to a given infinite utility stream, ade-
quate changes must improve the social welfare if every generation is at least as
well off after the change. The Weak Dominance axiom captures the following
spirit: Improving the welfare of exactly one generation suffices to improve the
social welfare. In turn, the Weak Pareto axiom requests that all generations
increase their utility for the social welfare to improve. The Strong Pareto ax-
iom is stronger: It imposes that if at least one generation increases its utility
then the social welfare must improve. Formally:
Axiom WD (Weak Dominance). If x,y ∈ X and there is j ∈ N such that
xj > yj, and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then W(x) > W(y).
Axiom WP (Weak Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x y, then W(x) > W(y).
Axiom SP (Strong Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then W(x) > W(y) .
Another relaxed form of Strong Pareto that is unrelated to either WP or WD
is Monotonicity.
Axiom M (Monotonicity). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then W(x) >W(y) .
Finally, a condition that relates to Koopmans’ [9] stationarity postulate is the
following independence condition.
Axiom IF (Independent Future). For each x = (x1, ..., xn, ....) ∈ X, y =
(y1, ..., yn, ....) ∈ X such that x1 = y1 :
W(x) >W(y) if and only if W(x2, ..., xn, .....) >W(y2, ..., yn, .....)
This axiom captures the idea that decisions affecting the future (i.e., from
period 2 on) generations can be made as if the present was one period forward,
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when the allocations to the present are the same along the alternatives. It is
central in the analysis by Asheim et al. [3].
2.2 Some relationships
In this Subsection we give some direct relationships for Monotonic or Weakly
Dominant SWFs when X = [0, 1]N . Lemma 1 below proves that axioms HE
and VWIA are equivalent under either M or WD, and that in addition, in
the presence of WD both egalitarian axioms are equivalent to the following
strengthened form of their conjunction (and of PDT):
Axiom SEP (Strong Equity Preference). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj >
yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) > W(x).
Lemma 1 Let W be an SWF on X.
(a) If W is M then axioms HE and VWIA are equivalent.
(b) If W is WD then axioms HE, VWIA, and SEP are equivalent and imply
PDT. 4
3 Implementing inequality aversion under weak Pareto: Impossi-
bility results
In this Section we produce various impossibility results for representable social
welfare relations on X = [0, 1]N . Our first result establishes the incompatibil-
ity of PDT and WP:
Proposition 1 There are not SWFs on X that verify PDT and WP. 5
Because we renounced Weak Dominance in order to investigate if some possi-
bility result emerges by relaxing Strong Pareto, our next Proposition is inde-
pendent of Proposition 1.
4 The proof that VWIA implies HE under M does not need any specific form of
the programmes space. Bossert et al. [8] prove a fact in line with (b): SP and HE
together imply SEP which in turn, obviously implies PDT. PDT can be regarded
as a cardinal version of SEP.
5 The full force of PDT and WP is not used along the proof. Our argument en-
sures incompatibility of a weaker version of PDT with a weaker version of WP.
Furthermore, incompatibility of SEP with WP is a trivial consequence.
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Proposition 2 There are not SWFs on X that verify HE and WP. 6
We now put forward a result apropos VWIA:
Proposition 3 There are not SWFs on X that verify VWIA and WP. 7
Finally we check that although there are SWFs that verify HEF, M, and WP,
the occurrence of dictatorial generations can not be avoided by imposing IF
to the criteria. In fact we can prove something stronger:
Proposition 4 There are not SWFs on X that verify IF, HEF, and WP.
The latter Proposition deserves further comments. For SWRs under M and a
restricted continuity assumption, Asheim et al. [3, Theorem 2] prove that IF,
a weak sensitivity condition, and another postulate in Koopmans’ [9] analysis
named Independent Present contradict HEF. In view of Koopmans’ charac-
terization of discounted utilitarianism, this accounts for its failure to verify
HEF. By refusing to impose any continuity restriction, thus giving up nu-
merical representability, [3, Proposition 13] proves the existence of complete
orderings that verify Independent Present, IF, HEF, and SP. With respect to
this achievement, Proposition 4 shows that even if we are willing to deny Inde-
pendent Present and relax the efficiency criteria to WP then representability
can not be gained.
Remark 1 Propositions 1 to 4 would be compelling even if M were added to
WP as a requirement. We emphasize that according to our proofs, Monotonic-
ity does not play any role in the incompatibilities we have scrutinized. The fact
that we can prove the current statements brings causes of incompatibility to
light with a better accuracy. Observe also that under Monotonicity, Proposition
3 reduces to Proposition 2 by Lemma 1 b).
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (a). Let us assume that W is Monotonic and
satisfies VWIA. In order to check for HE let us select x,y ∈ X such that
xj > yj > yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k. Define z ∈ X
such that zj = yk, and zt = yt when t 6= j. Then VWIA entails W(z) >W(x).
Now M implies W(y) >W(z) and the conclusion W(y) >W(x) follows.
Now let us assume that W is Monotonic and satisfies HE. In order to check for
VWIA let us select x,y ∈ X such that xj > yj = yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N,
and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k. Define z ∈ X such that zj = yj, yk > zk > xk,
6 Our argument ensures incompatibility of HE with a weaker version of WP.
7 Our argument ensures incompatibility of VWIA with a weaker version of WP.
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and zt = yt when j 6= t 6= k. Then HE entails W(z) > W(x). Because M
implies W(y) >W(z), the conclusion W(y) >W(x) follows. SEP obviously
implies HE, VWIA, and PDT. Let W be a Weakly Dominant SWF.
Part (b). SEP obviously implies HE, VWIA, and PDT. By mimicking the
proof that Monotonic SWFs that satisfy VWIA are HE we can conclude that
Weakly Dominant SWFs that satisfy VWIA verify a strengthened version of
HE. Now let us assume that W is Weakly Dominant and satisfies HE. In order
to check for SEP, we select x,y ∈ X such that xj > yj > yk > xk for some
j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k. We separately consider two cases:
(i) If yj > yk then we generate z ∈ X such that zt = xt when t 6= k, and
yk > zk > xk. Now WD implies W(z) > W(x), and the conclusion follows
because W(y) >W(z) due to HE.
(ii) If yj = yk then we generate z ∈ X such that zt = xt when j 6= t 6= k, and
yj = yk > zj > zk > xk. Due to HE, W(z) >W(x). By WD, W(y) > W(z)
and the conclusion W(y) > W(x) follows. 
Proof of Proposition 1. If W : X −→ R satisfies PDT and WP then
we can assign an uncountable number of different rational numbers, which is
impossible, in the following manner. For each 0 < x < 1
2
we fix 0 < εx such
that x+ εx <
1
2
, and then let
L(x) := W (1− x, x, x, ....) and R(x) := W
(
1− x
2
, x+ εx, x+ (εx)
2, ....
)
thus I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) 6= ∅ due to WP. We proceed to prove that I(x) ∩
I(y) = ∅, i.e., L(y) > R(x), for every 1
2
> y > x > 0.
Associated with x and y we select n0, the minimum natural number with the
property that n > n0 implies y > x+ (εx)
n−1. We also select y − x− (εx)n0 >
ε > 0 sufficiently small to allow for the existence of k1 and k2, natural numbers
with the properties 1 − x
2
< 1 − y + k1ε 6 1 and x + εx < y + k2ε 6 1. A
sequential application of (a relaxed version of) PDT proves that
L(y) = W (1− y, y, y, ....) >
>W (1− y + ε, y, n0−1.........., y, y − ε, y, y, ....) > ... >
>W
(
1− y + k1 ε, y, n0−1.........., y, y − ε, k1........., y − ε, y, y, ....
)
> ... >
>W
(
1− y + k1 ε, y + k2 ε, n0−1.........., y + k2 ε, y − ε, k1+k2·(n0−1)..................., y − ε, y, y, ....
)
(Intuitively: we compare streams where a positive amount ε of utility is ex-
changed between a generation beyond the n0 threshold and another before it,
which preserves their relative ranking. And we do this k1 + k2 · (n0 − 1) many
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times). Now (a relaxed version of) WP assures that
W
(
1− y + k1 ε, y + k2 ε, n0−1........, y + k2 ε, y − ε, k2·n0............., y − ε, y, y, ....
)
>
W
(
1− x
2
, x+ εx, x+ (εx)
2, ....
)
= R(x)
because 1 − y + k1ε > 1 − x2 , y + k2ε > x + εx > x + (εx)2 > ...., and
y > y− ε > x+ (εx)n0 > x+ (εx)n0+1 > .... This completes the argument. 
Proof of Proposition 2. If W : X −→ R verifies HE and WP then we
can assign an uncountable number of different rational numbers, which is
impossible, as follows. Let ε = 0.1, δ = 0.2. For each 0 < x < 1
2
we let
L(x) := W
(
x+ ε2, x+ ε3, x+ ε4, ....
)
, R(x) := W
(
x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....
)
thus I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) 6= ∅ due to WP. We proceed to prove that I(x) ∩
I(y) = ∅, or W (y + ε2, y + ε3, y + ε4, ....) >W (x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....), for
every 1
2
> y > x > 0.
Case 1: y + ε2 > x + ε, i.e., y − x > ε − ε2. Then y + εn+1 > x + εn follows
from trivial computations for each n = 1, 2, ...., thus WP yields the thesis.
Case 2: y+ ε2 6 x+ ε. Let m > 1 denote the first index for which y+ εm+1 >
x + εm. This number is well defined because limk( y + ε
k+1) = y > x =
limk(x + ε
k). Observe that y + εn+1 > x + εn for each n > m too, because
y − x > εm(1 − ε) > εn(1 − ε) for all n > m. We use the trivial consequence
y + εn+1 > 1
2
(y + εn+1 + x+ εn) = x+y+ε
n(1+ε)
2
> x+ εn for each n > m.
A sequential application of HE proves that
L(y)
(†)
>W
(
x+ δ, y + ε3, y + ε4, ...., y + εm,
x+ y + εm(1 + ε)
2
, y + εm+2, ...
)
(‡)
>
W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, y + ε4, ...., y + εm,
x+ y + εm(1 + ε)
2
,
x+ y + εm+1(1 + ε)
2
, y + εm+3, ...
)
> ... >
>W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, ...., x+ εm−2,
x+ y + εm(1 + ε)
2
, ...,
x+ y + ε2m−2(1 + ε)
2
, y + ε2m, ...
)
To be precise, inequality (†) derives from x+ δ > x+ ε > y+ ε2 > y+ εm+1 >
x+y+εm(1+ε)
2
, (‡) derives from x+ε > y+ε2 > y+ε3 > y+εm+2 > x+y+εm+1(1+ε)
2
,
and so forth. Now WP assures that
W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, ...., x+ εm−2,
x+ y + εm(1 + ε)
2
, ...,
x+ y + ε2m−2(1 + ε)
2
, y + ε2m, ...
)
>
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W
(
x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....
)
= R(x)
because x + δ > x + ε, x + ε > x + ε2, ... , and x+y+ε
m(1+ε)
2
> x + εm, ...,
x+y+ε2m−2(1+ε)
2
> x+ ε2m−2, y + ε2m > x+ ε2m−1, .... This ends the argument.

Proof of Proposition 3. If W : X −→ R verifies VWIA and WP then
we can assign an uncountable number of different rational numbers, which is
impossible, in the following manner. Let ε = 0.1, δ = 0.2. For each 0 < x < 1
2
we let
L(x) := W ((x)con) and R(x) := W
(
x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....
)
thus I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) 6= ∅ due to WP. We proceed to prove that I(x) ∩
I(y) = ∅ for every 1
2
> y > x > 0.
Case 1: y > x+ ε. Then the conclusion follows from WP since y > x+ εn for
each n thus L(y) = W ((y)con) > R(x).
Case 2: x+ ε > y. Now we select z, a number strictly between x and y, such
that x + ε > x + ε2 > ... > x + εn > z > x + εn+1 > ... for some n (that is: a
number y > z > x that does not coincide with any x+ εn). We use the trivial
consequence z > z+x+ε
m+1
2
> x+ εm+1 for each m = n, n+ 1, ..... A sequential
application of VWIA proves that
L(y) >W ((z)con)
(†)
>W
(
x+ δ, z, n−1.........., z,
z + x+ εn+1
2
, z, ....
)
(‡)
>
>W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, z, n−2.........., z,
z + x+ εn+1
2
,
z + x+ εn+2
2
, z, ....
)
> ... >
>W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, ...., x+ εn−1,
z + x+ εn+1
2
, ....,
z + x+ ε2n
2
, z, z, ...
)
To be precise, inequality (†) derives from x + δ > x + ε > z > z+x+εn+1
2
, (‡)
derives from x+ ε > z > z+x+ε
n+2
2
, and so forth. Now WP assures that
W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, ...., x+ εn−1,
z + x+ εn+1
2
, ....,
z + x+ ε2n
2
, z, z, ...
)
>
W
(
x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....
)
= R(x)
This ends the argument. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We need the following auxiliary result.
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Lemma 2 If W : X −→ R verifies IF, WP, and HEF then: For each n ∈ N
and y1, ..., yn, x, z ∈ [0, 1] such that y1 > x, ... , yn > x, x > z,
W( (x)con ) >W(y1, ..., yn, (z)con )
Proof of Lemma 2. The case n = 1 amounts to the following statement that
we use along this proof:
W( (x)con ) > W(y, (z)con ) for each x, y, z ∈ [0, 1] with y > x > z (1)
To prove (1) observe that the case x = y is direct from IF and WP. Assume
y > x, and select x > x′ > z. IF and WP entail W( (x)con ) > W(x, (x′)con ),
and the claim follows because HEF implies W(x, (x′)con ) >W(y, (z)con ).
Let us now prove the thesis. Select ε > 0 such that x > z + (n − 1)ε. Due
to (1) we can assure W( (x)con ) > W(y1, (z + (n − 1)ε)con ). Now we refer
to y2 > z + (n − 1)ε > z + (n − 2)ε in order to apply (1) and deduce the
inequality W((z+(n−1)ε)con ) > W(y2, (z+(n−2)ε)con ). Using IF we obtain
W(y1, (z + (n − 1)ε)con ) > W(y1, y2, (z + (n − 2)ε)con ). An iterative process
yields W( (x)con ) > W(y1, (z+ (n− 1)ε)con ) > ... > W(y1, .., yn, (z)con ). 
If W : X −→ R verifies IF, WP, and HEF then we can assign an uncountable
number of different rational numbers, which is impossible, as follows. For each
x ∈ (0, 1) let ai(x) = x + 1−xi+1 , i = 1, 2, ..., in such way that the {ai(x)}i
sequence is strictly decreasing, tends to x, and 1 > ai(x) > x throughout. Let
L(x) := W ((x)con) and R(x) := W (a1(x), ..., an(x), ...)
thus I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) 6= ∅ by WP. We prove I(x) ∩ I(y) = ∅, i.e.,
L(y) = W ((y)con) > R(x) = W (a1(x), ..., an(x), ...), for each 1 > y > x > 0.
If ((y)con)  (a1(x), ..., an(x), ...) then WP yields the conclusion. Therefore
assume that there is m > 1, the first index for which y > an(x) whenever
n > m. Select b < 1 such that b > a1(x) > y. An application of Lemma 2
produces W ((y)con) > W
(
b, m−1......, b, (y+am(x)
2
)con
)
, and furthermore WP yields
W
(
b, m−1......, b, (y+am(x)
2
)con
)
> W (a1(x), ..., am(x), ...). This ends the proof. 
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